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Note
"Single vs. Multiple" Criminal Conspiracies: A

Uniform Method of Inquiry for Due Process and
Double Jeopardy Purposes
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether a given course of conduct constitutes a single
criminal conspiracy or several separate conspiracies presents
important issues under the due process and double jeopardy
clauses' of the Constitution-the two contexts in which the
question arises. 2 Although due process and double jeopardy
considerations are different in most respects, on this question
the threshold factual inquiry is essentially the same: whether
the defendants' conduct constituted one or several conspiracies. Courts have taken an ad hoc approach to this inquiry and
have developed several different tests, each of which tends to
1. Both clauses are lodged in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.
The due process clause states: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Due process
protections are applicable to the states by virtue of the Constitution's fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The due process provision "is essentially a recognition of the requirement of fundamental fairness and fair play
under a given set of circumstances." United States v. American Honda Motor
Co., 273 F. Supp. 810, 819 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
The double jeopardy clause states: "No person shall be... subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
This clause is also applicable to the states. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,
794 (1969), rev'g, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See also Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977); Comment, Double Jeopardy-Definingthe Same
Offense, 32 LA. L. REV. 87, 88 (1971). Defendants are protected from multiple
prosecutions brought by states and municipalities that are based on the same
conduct, Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1970), but separate prosecutions
for a single course of conduct are permitted in state and federal courts. Abbate
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377,
382 (1922). The general practice, however, is that prosecution in one court precludes prosecution in the other. See Note, Double Jeopardy: Multiple Prosecutions Arising from the Same Transaction, 15 Am. CRnM. L REV. 259, 277-78
(1978). Indeed, a number of states have enacted statutes barring state prosecution subsequent to federal prosecution "for an offense arising from the same
set of facts." Note, Developments in the Law--Criminal Conspiracy,72 HtARv.
L. REV. 920, 968 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
2. See text accompanying notes 17-27 infra.
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be unfair in at least some factual settings. Courts have not
been consistent in selecting from among the various tests currently in use, and as a result judicial outcomes crucial to defendants' rights have often been determined by the test
employed rather than the facts in a given case. This Note examines each of the tests that have been applied in the due
process and double jeopardy contexts. It concludes by proposing a systematic series of factual inquiries that could be uniformly applied in such contexts to provide fair and consistent
treatment of similarly situated defendants.
I.

A.

THE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY

RATIONALE AND ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME

Conspiracy is usually defined as an agreement between

3
two or more individuals to accomplish an unlawful purpose.
Thus, although courts will often not convict absent proof of
some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,4 it is the mere
agreement that is punishable. 5 Conspiracy law is designed to
address the dangers to society that are inherent in group activity: groups can achieve illegal ends of larger scope and com-

3. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893); United States v.
Sanchez-Meza, 547 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting Callan v. Wilson, 127
U.S. 540, 555 (1888)); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 123 (1842);
King v. Jones, 4 B. & Ad. 345, 349, 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487 (K.B. 1832).
4. See, e.g., Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942); Pierce v.
United States, 252 U.S. 239, 244 (1920).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Feda, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1974); United States v.
Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947). The Poulterer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (1611),
originated the doctrine that agreement is the gist of conspiracy and is thus punishable even when its purpose is not achieved. This doctrine has been adopted
in the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1974);
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947); Braverman v. United States, 317
U.S. 49 (1942). If the existence of an agreement can be proven, a conspiracy in
which success was factually impossible may still be punishable. See generally
Bedow v. United States, 70 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1934); State v. Moretti 52 N.L 182,
244 A.2d 499 (1968); Developments, supra note 1, at 94445.
Unlike at common law, see Developments, supra note 1, at 968, once a substantive crime has been consummated, the conspiracy does not merge with the
substantive offense but continues to be separately punishable. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 789 (1945). The rationale for
such treatment is that the law of conspiracy serves ends different from and
complementary to criminal prohibitions of the substantive offense. See
Kurlewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("basic rationale of the law of conspiracy is that a conspiracy may be an evil in
itself, independently of any other evil it seeks to accomplish"). One commentator has stated that defendants are rarely convicted of both the substantive offense and conspiracy. See Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in
Theory and in Practice,65 GEo. L.J. 925, 938 (1977). Nevertheless, the ability to
prosecute a defendant for both is a powerful prosecutorial tool.
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plexity than can individuals; 6 group support dynamics make
actual execution of plans more likely;7 and such concerted efforts prepare participants for "habitual criminal practices." 8
Defining the mere agreement as a crime allows "preventive intervention" before the substantive offense is committed. 9
Three elements must be proved to establish the existence
of a conspiracy and each defendant's involvement in it:10 1)

knowledge of the main object of the conspiracy;" 2) knowledge
6. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961). See generally Developments, supra note 1, at 924.
7. See Developments, supra note 1, at 924.
8. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915). See also Callanan v.
United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
9. Model Penal Code § 5.03, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). See generally Marcus, supra note 5, at 937-38; Developments, supra note 1, at 968-71.
10. The general rule is that there must be proof of the agreement itself to
obtain a conviction. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScowT, HANDBOOK ON CImINA. LAw,

§ 62, at 460 (1972). Because of the secretive nature of most conspiracies, however, there is rarely direct evidence of an agreement. See United States v.
Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915). The Supreme Court hhs acknowledged this
difficulty: "No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy. Often crimes are a matter of inference deduced from the acts of the person accused and done in pursuance of a criminal purpose." American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946). Not every person involved with
the conspirators, however, will be considered part of the conspiracy, for
"[t] hose having no knowledge of the conspiracy are not conspirators." United
States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940).
11. See United States v. Thomas, 586 F.2d 123, 132 (9th Cir. 1978); Marino v.
United States, 91 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 1937); United States v. American Honda
Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 979, 986, (N.D. Cal. 1967) (a "common design ... is the
essence of [a] conspiracy," and is sufficiently established by a showing that the
parties steadily pursued the same objective). To be convicted of conspiracy, a
defendant need not have been aware of all the various activities of the other
members; it is enough that he or she knew of the conspiracy's general purpose.
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (evidence of knowledge of
the details of the conspiracy not required).
In some cases defendants have been acquitted of conspiracy charges because they were not aware of facts which made their actions violations of federal law. A leading example is United States v. Crinmins, 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir.
1941), where the defendant was convicted both of conspiring to receive stolen
bonds which had been transported in interstate commerce and of the substantive crime of receiving such bonds. Since the defendant was unaware that the
bonds had crossed state lines, the court affirmed the substantive conviction but
reversed the conspiracy conviction. Id. at 273. Justice Hand explained the
court's reasoning by using his famous "traffic light" analogyWhile one may, for instance, be guilty of running past a traffic light of
whose existence one is ignorant, one cannot be guilty of conspiring to
run past such a light, for one cannot agree to run past a light unless
one supposes that there is a light to run past.
Id. Accord, United States v. Vilhotti, 452 F.2d 1186, 1190 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 623-24 (2d Cir.
1948), cert. denied sub nom. Grinaldi v. United States, 337 U.S. 931 (1949). Contra,United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 689-92 (1975); United States v. Polesti,
489 F.2d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 1970).
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of the scope of the conspiracy, or at least an awareness of the
involvement of others;12 and 3) specific intent to join the conspiracy,13 although such intent can often be inferred.14 Prosecutors are afforded significant procedural advantages in
5
conspiracy cases, primarily in the admissibility of evidence'
12. See United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337, 1345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,419
U.S. 1008 (1974). See also United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 545 F.2d 785, 790
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917 (1977); United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d
971, 983 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975).
13. See United States v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Craft v. United States, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975); Causey v. United States, 352
F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1965). Specific intent is important because mere knowledge of a conspiratorial act may not be sufficient to support the inference of active participation in the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d
1337, 1343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974); Causey v. United States,
352 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1965). This issue often arises when an individual supplies raw materials that are appropriate for legal use but that the supplier
knows will be used for an illegal purpose by members of the conspiracy. In
United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1940), the defendant knowingly
sold sugar to a group that was operating illicit stills. The court concluded that
the defendant had not been part of the agreement to promote the '"moonshine"
conspiracy because he had no interest in the end result of the effort. Id. at 581.
See generally Marcus, CriminalConspiracy: The State of Mind Crime-Inten
Proving Intent, and Anti-FederalIntent, 1976 U. ILT. L.F. 627.
14. See cases cited in note 13 supra. See also United States v. Johnson, 513
F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Steele, 469 F.2d 165, 169 (10th Cir.
1972); United States v. Chamley, 376 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 1964). Having a "vital stake" in concealing the
conspiracy has also been considered evidence of a defendant's conspiratorial
intent. See, e.g., United States v. Dyar, 574 F.2d 1385, 1389 (5th Cir. 1978). Such
a "stake-in-the-venture" rule may help determine whether the defendant had
an interest in the objective of the conspiracy and thus the intent to aid it.
Conspiratorial intent is likely to be inferred when a defendant has supplied
goods or services that have no lawful use, or when the goods are legally restricted and the quantity supplied is greater than that required for legitimate
purposes. See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711-12 (1943)
(amounts of morphine sulphate sold by defendant to rural physician so large
that defendant was charged with knowledge that the drug was being dispensed
illegally); People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 478-79, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 632-33
(1967).
15. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (quoting United
States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1938)) ("Participation in a criminal
conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan
may be inferred from a 'development and a collocation of circumstances."');
United States v. Westover, 511 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1009 (1975); United States v. Garelle, 438 F.2d 366, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1970) (quoting
United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 895 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Haywood v. United States, 396 U.S. 852 (1969)) ("when a member of a conspiracy is arrested, even after termination of the conspiracy, names and addresses
found upon him or in his premises are admissible as circumstantial evidence of
an agreement among the conspirators thus linked"). See generally Johnson,
The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy,61 CAL. L REv. 1137, 1142 n.17 (1973);
Marcus, supra note 5, at 925-56 (1977). "Most conspiracy convictions are based
on circumstantial evidence, and this evidence is often admitted under rather
loose standards of relevance." W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTt, supra note 10, § 61, at
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and the selection of venue and jurisdiction.16

B. THE DUE PROCESS CoxTr
The "single versus multiple conspiracy" question often
arises as a due process issue.17 A defendant indicted for participation in a large conspiracy, who actually participated in only
a small part of the operation and lacked knowledge of the existence or purpose of the larger operation, will seek to avoid being
tried along with those accused of the larger conspiracy.'8 The
defendant's factual claim is that more than one conspiracy, if
any, was operating, and that he or she was not involved in the
larger conspiracy. 19 Procedurally, the defendant can assert due
457. In addition, the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is available in
conspiracy cases. See Johnson, supra, at 1183-88. Under this exception "any
act or declaration by one co-conspirator committed during and in furtherance
of the conspiracy is admissible against each co-conspirator." W. LAFAVE & A.
Sco-r, supra note 10, § 61, at 457; see 4 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1079 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1972). See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442-43
(1949); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946). This hearsay exception
is circumscribed by the requirement that "independent nonhearsay evidence
must establish the participation in the conspiracy of the person against whom"
the hearsay is to be admitted. United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1234 (2d
Cir. 1979). See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942); United
States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied sub nom. Lynch
v. United States, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970).
16. Rules governing venue and jurisdiction allow a conspiracy case to be
tried either where the agreement occurred or where any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any conspirator. W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTr, supra note 10, § 61, at 456. This allows the government to hold the trial
where the evidence and witnesses are located, but also permits selection of a
district inconvenient for a defendant or one in which the jury may be more
likely to convict. Id. The court does, however, retain discretion to transfer the
case. See FED. HL CRim. P. 21(b).
17. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
18. A co-conspirator is held liable for acts committed by the other members because any act in furtherance of the conspiracy becomes an act of each
individual conspirator, at least in the absence of a new agreement. Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946); Blue v. United States, 138 F.2d 351, 359
(6th Cir. 1943). Because of the harshness of this rule, juries are instructed to
assess the varying degrees of participation by different members and to acquit
any whom the jury believes were not part of the agreement. See, e.g., United
States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 386 n.4 (2d Cir. 1964). The use of special verdict
interrogatories to compel an assessment of each defendant's degree of participation may improve the chances that juries will carefully consider these elements. See, e.g., United States v. Arroyo, 494 F.2d 1316, 1318 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 827 (1974). However, in a large trial-common to most conspiracy cases-it may be difficult for an individual defendant to rebut the jury's intuitive inference of his guilt by association. See Marcus, supra note 5, at 943-46.
19. An individual who may have participated in only one small part of a
large operation cannot, consistent with the constitutional right to due process,
be held liable for the actions of other conspirators whose existence and goals
were unknown to him or her. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 784
(1975); United States v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
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process rights in two ways: he or she can move for a severance
before trial2O or establish an error of variance after trial.21 The
severance issue is generally determined by the degree of
prejudice that would be generated toward the defendant as a
result of the defendant being tried with the core members of
the conspiracy.22 Undue prejudice also underlies the variance
doctrine.2 3 Under this doctrine, if a defendant convicted for
participation in one large conspiracy can show that the evidence proved the existence of multiple conspiracies (in some of
which the defendant did not participate), the conviction will
often be reversed because of the tendency of juries to transfer
the guilt of core conspirators to all of the defendants. 24 The
"single versus multiple conspiracy" determination is thus central to the disposition of a variance claim and may form the basis of a severance request.
C.

THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CONTEXT

The "single versus multiple conspiracy" question may also
arise under the double jeopardy clause. 25 In this situation, the
defendant seeks to show that he or she has already stood trial
for the same conspiracy, while the prosecution generally attempts to show that separate conspiracies are at issue.26 The
underlying factual inquiry is often the same here as in the due
Craft v. United States, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975). The due process concern is the
prejudice arising from "the transference of guilt to an individual defendant involved in one conspiracy from evidence incriminating defendants in a conspiracy in which the particular defendant was not involved." United States v.
Levine, 569 F.2d 1175, 1177 (1st Cir. 1978).
20. FED. R. CRnm. P. 14. See generally Geer, Representation of Multiple
CriminalDefendants: Conflicts of Interest and the ProfessionalResponsibilities
of the Defense Attorney, 62 MiNN.L. REv. 119, 143 (1978); Developments, supra
note 1, at 982-83.
21. See generally Note, Resolution of the Multiple ConspiraciesIssue Via a
"Natureof the Enterprise"Analysis: The Resurrection of Agreement, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 243, 243 (1975).
22. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 469 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Geer, supra note 20, at 143; Developments, supra note 1, at 982; note 19 supra.
23. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 752, 756 (1946); United
States v. Levine, 569 F.2d 1175, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1975); Note, Federal Treatment of Multiple Conspiracies,57 COLuM. L. REv. 387, 396-97 (1957).
24. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 766-67 (1946); United
States v. Levine, 569 F.2d 1175, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1978). See generally Note, supra
note 23, at 402. The defendant's burden is not easily met because the "harmless
error" rule provides that "any error... or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R. Cans. P. 52(a). See generally
Note, supra note 23, at 396-405.
25. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
26. Ironically, this is the opposite of the due process setting where a de-
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process context: whether one or several conspiracies existed.
The framework in which the double jeopardy inquiry is made,
however, is substantially different. The double jeopardy clause
protects defendants against multiple punishments for the same
offense, prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, and
prosecution for the same offense after conviction.27 Because
these double jeopardy protections usually are triggered only
upon the commencement of a second prosecution, courts have
developed a variety of tests that compare the statutes and evidence involved in two prosections. The issue of "single versus
multiple conspiracy" must therefore be resolved within this
body of comparative tests.

M. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF INQUIRY
This section analyzes the conventional approaches that
courts have taken to determine whether a given course of conduct constitutes one or several conspiracies.

A. "NATURE OF THE ENTERPRISE" TEST
Criminal conspiracies are often considered to take one of
two structural forms: the "hub of the wheel" 28 or the "chain." 29
fendant usually tries to show that what a court had considered as one conspiracy was in fact several separate conspiracies.
27. Protection from multiple punishments is afforded to prevent the imposition of more than one punishment for a single crime. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161, 165 (1977). See also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 200 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring); Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 575 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting); O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199, 1203 (1st Cir. 1972). See
generally Note, supra note 1, at 259. Protection from reprosecution after acquittal is based on the fundamental unfairness of allowing the government to
reargue its case, adding new evidence and relining its arguments each time in
search of a conviction. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 1, at 88; Comment, Twice
in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 267 (1965). Without this protection, the state
would be able to use its superior resources to make repeated attempts to convict a defendant, each time subjecting the defendant to the ordeal of trial and
increasing the possibility that, though innocent, he or she may eventually be
convicted. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). See United States
v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896); United States v. Engle, 458 F.2d 1021, 1025 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972); United States v. American Honda Motor
Co., 271 F. Supp. 979, 987 (N.D. Cal. 1967). The third guarantee, protection from
reprosecution after conviction, incorporates both of the major interests served
by the first two guarantees of the double jeopardy clause: protection from punishment in excess of that mandated by a legislature and protection from the inherent unfairness of vexatious retrial. See Comment, supra note 1, at 88.
28. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). In Kotteakos,
a central figure acted as a broker to fraudulently obtain government loans. Id.
at 753. Several "middlemen" with whom he dealt participated only in their separate transactions and were not aware of the full scope of the operation. Id. at
754-55. The Supreme Court determined that a number of smaller conspiracies
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In the former, the peripheral members-the "spokes"--have no
dealings with or awareness of each other. They individually
deal with one central figure-the "hub"-and thus together represent a collection of smaller, separate conspiracies rather than
a single, large conspiracy.30 In the "chain" conspiracy, each actor may play but a small role in the totality of criminal activity,
but all are presumed to know the scope of the conspiracy because of their interdependence. 31 Such conspiracies typically
involve a "chain" of persons involved in the illegal manufac32
ture, importation, or distribution of goods.
To distinguish between "hub" and "chain" conspiracies,
courts generally inquire into the "nature of the enterprise."33
Factual elements such as the type of operation and the goods
involved are examined to determine whether the participants
knew that their own success was dependent on others in the
"chain." If it is determined that the participants had knowledge of the "chain," then their knowledge of and intent to join
the larger conspiracy can be inferred, and each defendant can
be held liable for acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy..
were involved rather than a single, large one. Id. at 755. Cf. Blumenthal v.
United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557-59 (1947) (one general conspiracy found because
only two agreements were involved and participants "knew or must have
known" of the "overriding scheme").
29. See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
30. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 752-55 (1946).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). Courts infer that the participants understand that others are working with them although they may not have direct, demonstrable knowledge. This method of analysis is discussed in detail in Note,
supra note 21, at 250-308.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Leong, 536 F.2d 993, 994-95 (2d Cir. 1976) (importation and distribution of narcotics); United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921,
922 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939) (same). But see United
States v. La Vecchia, 513 F.2d 1210, 1218 (2d Cir. 1975) (counterfeiting operation).
33. The distinction between "hub" and "chain" conspiracies is limited to
the question of whether defendants had knowledge of the purpose and scope of
the conspiracy, an important issue in many due process cases. For a detailed
discussion of "nature of the enterprise" analysis, see generally Note, supra
note 21.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 1976) ("naof
ture of the enterprise determines whether this presumption or inference
is justiknowledge of broader scope and participation in a single conspiracy
fied"); United States v. Leong, 536 F.2d 993, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1976) (knowledge of
scope inferred from large amount of heroin distributed); United States v. La
Vecchia, 513 F.2d 1210, 1218 (2d Cir. 1975) (knowledge of scope and object inferred from the large amount of counterfeit currency printed); United States v.
Ortega-Alvarez, 506 F.2d 455, 457 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975)

1980]

METHOD OF INQUIRY

Although this inference of knowledge and intent may seem
warranted by the secret nature of most conspiracies, 35 it can vi3
olate a defendant's constitutional right to due process of law. 6
Many courts have held that once a conspiracy is shown to exist,
only slight evidence is required to connect a particular defendant with the conspiracy. 37 Thus, an individual who had contact
with a conspiracy could be convicted as a co-conspirator even
though he or she lacked demonstrable knowledge of the conspiracy's scope and did not intend to further its objectives. In
many cases, however, it is unreasonable to infer that an individual who was involved in a large operation dependent upon
the participation of others for its success had knowledge of the
operation's scope. A defendant who might have had some
knowledge of a conspiracy's purpose might not have shared in
decisionmaking or agreed to the plans of operation. In addition, other conspirators might have performed acts of which the
defendant was unaware or in which the defendant had not acquiesced. The Supreme Court has recognized, for example,
that "an endeavor as complex as a large-scale gambling enterprise might involve persons who have played appreciably
(scope and purpose inferred from the large amount of heroin distributed);
United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 827 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,372 U.S. 959
(1963) (presumption of knowledge of scope of and participation in narcotics
conspiracy); United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939) (smugglers knew middlemen must sell to retailers, and retailers knew middlemen must buy from importers; therefore conspirators at one end of the chain knew unlawful business did not stop with their
buyers and those at other end knew that it had not begun with their sellers);
People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 478-79, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 632-33, (1967) (intent can be inferred when goods or services have no lawful use or when volume
of business is disproportionate to any legitimate demand). See generally Note,
supra note 21, at 250-69.
35. Secrecy and concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy. The more completely they are achieved, the more successful
the crime. Hence the law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction
of those discovered upon showing sufficiently the essential nature of
the plan and their connections with it, without requiring evidence of
knowledge of all its details or of the participation of others. Otherwise
the difficulties, not only of discovery, but of certainty in proof and of
correlating proof with pleading would become insuperable, and conspirators would go free by their very ingenuity.
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (footnote omitted).
36. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1935); United States
v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 975-76 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975).
37. United States v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
non. Craft v. United States, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975); United States v. Reynolds, 511
F.2d 603, 607 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Westover, 511 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1009 (1975); United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821,
830 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 414 F.2d
909, 911 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Knight, 416 F.2d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.
1969).
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different roles, and whose level of culpability varies significantly."3 8 Despite this risk of "wrongful" convictions, some
courts have continued mechanically to apply the "nature of the

enterprise" test.3 9
B.

"SAME OFFENSE" TESTS

A number of tests have been developed to determine
whether a given prosecution is barred by the double jeopardy
clause. The double jeopardy inquiry usually arises when the
prosecutor alleges that a single conspiracy violated several statutes or that a single course of conduct furthered several distinct conspiracies. For the purpose of this Note, the inquiry is
relevant when a defendant attempts to bar a conspiracy prosecution by showing that the conspiracy presently alleged is the
same conspiracy for which the defendant was previously convicted or acquitted.40 The "single versus multiple conspiracy"
question is thus resolved by comparing the two prosecutions to
determine whether they involve the same offense. The judicial
tests used in this context are analyzed below.
1.

"Same Evidence" Test

The traditional test for determining whether offenses are
the same for double jeopardy purposes has been formulated as
follows: "A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no
bar to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of
them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon
the other."4 1 This "same evidence" test focuses on the statutes
38. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 784 (1975).
39. Such application is common in narcotics cases, but has increasingly occurred in other situations as well. For example, in United States v. LaVecchia,
513 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1975), defendants clearly were involved in only one part of
a counterfeiting conspiracy and were unaware of the larger scope of the operation. Nonetheless, defendants were deemed culpable for the larger conspiracy
because the court found each dependent upon the others for personal gain. Id.
at 1218. As one commentator neatly summarized, "La Vecchia is an apt illustration of the narcotics conspiracy body of precedent. Not only has it been
painted with too broad a brush, but subsequent courts have brushed it upon
unsuitable convases." Note, supra note 21, at 271.
40. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
41. Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871). Accord, Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
Although this formulation of the test is the majority rule, three variations
of the test also have currency. See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 89-91.
Under the first of these, offenses are considered the same if they are identical
in law and fact. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 380 (1906); United States
v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 545 F.2d 785, 792 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917
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allegedly violated. 42 The test is rarely of foremost importance
in conspiracy cases, however, probably because prosecutors
can easily vary their factual allegations in order to carve sev(1977); Kowalski v. Parratt, 533 F.2d 1071, 1074 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
844 (1976); United States v. McCall, 489 F.2d 359, 362 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 983 (1973);
Dryden v. United States, 403 F.2d 1008, 1009 (5th Cir. 1969). This "identity" test
requires that the facts alleged in the indictments be the same and that the offenses be equal. See United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 72 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 983 (1973). Thus, alleging slightly different facts in a second indictment
may allow a second prosecution of what is actually the same offense. Under
this test, a defendant could be indicted for a lesser included offense after being
acquitted of the greater offense, see Comment, supra note 1, at 90, but such a
practice is now precluded by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161 (1977), which held that greater and lesser included offenses are the
same for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 168.
The second variation of the "same evidence" test is usually expressed as
follows: "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932). Accord, Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977); Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911); United States v. Garner, 529 F.2d 962, 971 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976).
The third variation of the "same evidence" test puts emphasis on the facts
rather than on the statutes involved. Under this "backwards" standard, offenses are considered the same if the defendant could have been convicted of
the second offense based on the evidence that might properly have been offered at the first trial. Wilson v. State, 24 Conn. 57, 64 (1855); State v. Ingalls, 98
Iowa 728, 729, 68 N.W. 445, 445 (1896); In re Gano, 90 Kan. 134, 136, 132 P. 999,
1000 (1913); State v. Brownrigg, 87 Me. 500, 502-03, 33 A. 11, 12 (1895); Sharp v.
State, 61 Neb. 187, 190, 85 N.W. 38, 39 (1901). While the other versions compare
evidence required by statute or alleged in the indictments, the "backwards"
test is much more permissive: 'The test is not what facts were offered in evidence in the trial upon the first indictment, but from the record what facts
might have been proved under that indictment and whether the same facts if
proved under this indictment would warrant a conviction." State v. Brownrigg,
87 Me. 500, 502-03, 33 A. 11, 12 (1895). Some commentators support this test as a
means of preventing arbitrary reprosecution, see Note, supra note 21, at 274;
Comment, supra note 1, at 90, but it has not been adopted by the federal courts
and does not appear to be actively in use among the states.
42. If a single act violates several statutory provisions, such violation may
be punished with consecutive sentences. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 390-91 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82-84 (1955). See generally
Note, Consecutive Sentences in Single Prosecutions: JudicialMultiplication of
Statutory Penalties, 67 YALE L.J. 916, 918-20 (1958). In Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911), the defendant was convicted twice under different
statutes for the same act. One statute prohibited acting in a "drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any public place ... to the annoyance of another person." Id. at 341. The second punished "those who outrage, insult, or
threaten, by deed or word, public officials or agents of the authorities, in their
." Id. Since the defendant had insulted a police officer when he
presence ...
was also inebriated in a public place, convictions under both statutes were upheld because the offenses were different under the "same evidence" test. Id. at
343.
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eral conspiracies out of one.43 Prosecutors have been warned
that such action constitutes impermissible harassment of the
defendant,44 but a strict application of the "same evidence" test
would enable the government to change the list of participants,
dates, and overt acts in successive counts or indictmentsthereby obtaining several convictions for what is ostensibly one
45
conspiracy.
2.

"Same Transactions," Leglislative Intent, and the
Braverman Rule

Alternatives to the "same evidence" test seek to avoid the
inequities that can result when the prosecutor alleges that a
single conspiracy violates more than one statute.46 The
Supreme Court recently noted:
[A]t common law, and under early federal criminal statute[s] .... [a]
single course of criminal conduct was likely to yield but a single offense. In more recent times, with the advent of specificity in draftsmanship and the extraordinary proliferation of overlapping and related
statutory offenses, it became possible for prosecutors to spin out a startlingly numerous series of offenses from a single alleged criminal transaction. As the number of statutory offenses multipled, the potential for
unfair and abusive reprosecutions became far more pronounced. 47

The danger of abusive reprosecution is particularly great when
conspiracy is involved. In addition to statutes addressing specific types of conspiracies, 48 there is a general statute that
makes it a crime to "conspire ... to commit any offense
against the United States." 49 Sometimes it is alleged that a
conspiracy has violated this general statute as well as other
closely related, specific conspiracy statutes.5 0 Again, of course,
a prosecutor might attempt to manipulate factual allegations to
43. See United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 961 (1976).
44. See, e.g., United States v. American Honda Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 979,
987-88 (N.D. Cal. 1967) ("harassment in violation of the Due Process provision
of the Fifth Amendment").
45. See, e.g., Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942); United
States v. Bommarito, 524 F.2d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Mallah,
503 F.2d 971, 985 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Houltin, 525 F.2d 943, 950 (5th Cir.), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. Croucher v. United States, 429 U.S. 1034 (1976);
United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1975).
47. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970) (citations omitted).
48. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (conspiracy to monopolize trade); 18
U.S.C. § 894 (1976) (conspiracy to collect extensions of credit by extortion); 18
U.S.C. § 2385 (1976) (conspiracy to commit treason, sedition, or subversive activities to overthrow the government); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) (conspiracy to possess drugs with intent to distribute).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
50. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788
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charge several separate conspiracies under one or more of
these statutes. 51
A partial solution to the problem of abusive reprosecution
might be the "same transaction" test, which bars a second prosecution for crimes arising out of the same transaction for which
a defendant has already stood trial.52 This test, however, has
not been incorporated into the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy. 3 Moreover, a "same transaction" restriction
can only function as a compulsory joinder rule---it will not restrict multiple indictments arising out of the same transaction
when all of the indictments are brought at one trial.
Many courts address the problem of abusive reprosecution
by determining whether the legislative intent underlying the
relevant statutes was to allow a single conspiracy to be treated
as a violation of several statutes. Stated simply, the issue becomes whether Congress intended that punishment under the
applicable conspiracy statutes be cumulative, or whether the
punishment dictated by one of the statutes be viewed as adequate for "all" offenses. 5 For example, in United States v. Marotta5 6 a jury had found the appellant guilty of conspiring to
"possess with intent to distribute" 57 and conspiring to "import"58 marijuana. 59 The court determined that Congress had
(1946); United States v. Mori,444 F.2d 240, 241-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
913 (1971).
51. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
52. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). Under this text, all charges arising out of the same transaction must be
disposed of in a single proceeding. Id. See Comment, supra note 1, at 91; Comment, CriminalLaw-Double Jeopardy-Should "Offense" be Defined in Terms
of Substantive Law?, 38 Mo. L. REV. 528, 529 (1973). See also United States v.
DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1235 (2d Cir. 1979).
53. See United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456, 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,414
U.S. 823 (1973). See also United States v. Jones, 334 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 993 (1965); Comment, supra note 52, at 529.
54. "In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution, except in the most limited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges
against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode,
or transaction." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Brennan listed three exceptions to such a compulsory joinder rule: "where a crime is not completed or discovered, despite due
diligence.... until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes
arising from the same transaction," id. at 453 n.7; where "no single court had
jurisdiction of all the alleged crimes," id; and "where joinder would be prejudicial to either the prosecution or the defense." Id. at 455 n.11.
55. See, e.g., Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155-57 (1977).
56. 518 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1975).
57. Id. at 682 (guilty under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1970)).
58. 518 F.2d at 685 (guilty under 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1970)).
59. 518 F.2d at 685.
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"fully intended" to punish those who import marijuana with intent to distribute "twice as severely" as those who import marijuana solely for their own use,60 and held that this cumulative
61
punishment was not disproportionate to the crime.
While some courts look to the legislative history underlying
questions of severity of punishment, others focus on the
number of conspiracies involved. 62 Proponents of the former
approach argue that the members of one conspiracy can commit more than one crime and that each, therefore, can be pun63
ished without offending the double jeopardy clause.
Supporters of the latter approach argue that because the agreement is the gist of conspiracy, all acts performed in furtherance
of the agreement are part of a single crime of conspiracy. 64 For
example, in United States v. Honneus 65 the defendant appealed
three convictions under separate statutes for "importing," "distributing and possessing ... with intent to distribute," and
"smuggling" marijuana. 66 The Honneus court reached a conclusion contrary to that in Marotta:
While undoubtedly Congress meant to attack the drug trade with severity ....
we doubt that it meant to authorize, or could authorize, a
court to impose three punishments for one conspiracy. Congress may
treat different aspects of the same conduct as separate crimes only if
there is a meaningful distinction between the elements constituting
67
each offense.

The Honneus approach seems more faithful to the basic rationale of conspiracy law: that a conspiracy is an evil independent of the substantive crimes involved.68 Thus, in addition to
the cumulative punishment given conspirators for the substantive crimes committed in the course of their conspiracy, 69 the
Honneus approach would also punish conspirators for the conspiratorial aspect of the operation, unless the agreement in60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566, 569-70 (lst Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); United States v. Adcock, 487 F.2d 637, 639 (6th
Cir. 1973).
63. United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1975).
64. See United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566, 569-70 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); United States v. Adcock, 487 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir.
1973).
65. 508 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
66. Id. at 569 (statutory citations omitted). The conspiracy statutes involved in Honneus were those involved in Marotta, see notes 57-58 supra and
accompanying text, and the "general federal conspiracy statute," 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1976). See United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d at 569.
67. 508 F.2d at 569 (citation omitted).
68. See notes 3-9 supra and accompanying text.
69. See Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614, 622-23 (4th Cir. 1937).
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volved such unrelated activities as to suggest the operation of
distinct conspiracies. A conspiracy to distribute narcotics and
extend credit by extortion, for example, would be punishable
70
The Honneus
under both the applicable conspiracy statutes.
approach avoids the legal fiction that may result when a court
merely speculates on whether a legislature intended to allow
7
cumulative punishment. 1
The more recurrent double jeopardy issue arises when
multiple conspiracies, arguably based upon a single pattern of
conduct, are alleged under one statute.7 2 In principle, the
Supreme Court resolved this problem in Braverman v. United
States,73 which involved seven substantive offenses charged
under a single conspiracy statute. The Court held that
[W] hen a single agreement to commit one or more substantive crimes
is evidenced by an overt act, as the statute requires, the precise nature
and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the
agreement which embraces and defines its objects. Whether the object
of a single agreement is to commit one or many crimes, it is in either
case that agreement which constitutes the conspiracy which the statute punishes. The one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and hence several conspiracies because it envisages the
74
violation of several statutes rather than one.

The Braverman rule might be considered the "same intent" version of the "same transaction" test: all activities
united by a common agreement are treated as part of the same
transaction.7 5 This approach is theoretically sound. It prevents
the danger present under the "same evidence" test of manipulating evidence to make one conspiracy appear to be several,
and it avoids the necessity of determining legislative intent.
The Braverman rule poses a problem, however, in that it cannot be applied until it is clear that only one agreement-and
thus one conspiracy-is involved. The rule therefore does not
70. See generally note 48 supra and accompanying text.
71. For example, had the legislative intent behind the statutes involved in
Marotta and Honneus been clear, the results of the two cases would not be in
direct conflict. See also United States v. Houltin, 525 F.2d 943, 951 (5th Cir.
1976) (in accord with Marotta); United States v. Adcock, 487 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.
1973) (holding similar to Honneus).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Ruigomez, 576 F.2d 1149, 1150 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Martinez, 562 F.2d 633, 634-35 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 565 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, United States v. Pacelli, 470
F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 983 (1973); Arnold v. United
States, 366 F.2d 347, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 982 (1965).
73. 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
74. Id. at 53.
75. This modified test has not been used in a conspiracy case absent consideration of other tests or factors. See, e.g., United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d
1228, 1235 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. American Honda Motor Co., 271 F.
Supp. 979, 986 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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dispose of the necessity of determining whether multiple objectives and diverse participants are indicative of a single agreement or several separate conspiracy agreements. Because the
terms of such agreements must usually be inferred from evidence of the acts performed by the conspirators,7 6 it is difficult
to determine whether the acts were performed pursuant to a
common intent based upon the agreement. 77 Thus, although
the Braverman rule properly focuses inquiry on the number of
agreements involved in a given case, it is not easily applied.
IV. "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
Because of the problems associated with the tests outlined
above, many courts have adopted a "totality of the circumstances" approach to the determination of whether a given
course of conduct constitutes one or several conspiracies. The
factors most commonly considered in examining the "totality"
are: 1) the number of alleged overt acts in common; 78 2) the
overlap in personnel; 79 3) the time period during which the alleged acts took place; 80 4) the similarity in the methods of oper76. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
77. In conspiracy cases, intent is generally proved by showing that the defendant was a party to the agreement. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
78. See United States v. Parker, 582 F.2d 953, 955 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 315-16 (8th Cir.
1978); United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Ingman, 541 F.2d 1329, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bommarito, 524
F.2d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 983 (1973); Arnold v. United States, 336 F.2d 347, 350-51
(9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 982 (1965).
79. See United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Parker, 582 F.2d 953, 955 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 316 (8th Cir.
1978); United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Ruigomez, 576 F.2d 1149, 1151 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ingman, 541 F.2d
1329, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 821-22 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 560 (7th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Bommarito, 524 F.2d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Prince, 515
F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Craft v. United States, 423 U.S.
1032 (1975); United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 983 (1973); Arnold v. United States, 336 F.2d 347, 351 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 982 (1965).
80. See United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Parker, 582 F.2d 953, 955 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 316 (8th Cir.
1978); United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Ruigomez, 576 F.2d 1149, 1151 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Martinez, 562 F.2d
633, 638 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 821-22 (2d Cir.), cert.
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82
ation;81 5) the locations in which the alleged acts took place;
6) the extent to which purported conspiracies share a common
objective; 83 and 7) the degree of interdependence needed for
84
the overall operation to succeed.

United States v. Tercero85 illustrates how a result under the
"totality" analysis might differ from that under the "same evidence" test. In Tercero, defendants were indicted in both Arizona and Minnesota for similar but separate conspiracies "to
86
import into the United States and distribute marihuana."
Trial on the Arizona indictment resulted in a verdict of acquittal.87 Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the
Minnesota indictment, alleging that the Arizona and Minnesota
conspiracies were actually one conspiracy and that prosecution
in Minnesota would therefore violate the double jeopardy
clause. 88 The government argued that because some operations
were centered in Arizona and others in Minnesota, there were
denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 985 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 72
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,410 U.S. 983 (1973); Arnold v. United States, 336 F.2d
347, 351 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 982 (1965).
81. See United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 316 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977);
United States v. Ingman, 541 F.2d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d
149, 155 (2d Cir. 1975).
82. See United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 316 (8th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977); United States
v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); United
States v. Bommarito, 524 F.2d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Mallah,
503 F.2d 971, 985 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975); Arnold v. United
States, 336 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 982 (1965).
83. See United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Parker, 582 F.2d 953, 955 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Ruigomez, 576 F.2d 1149, 1151 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. American
Honda Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 979, 983 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
84. See United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 316 n.16 (8th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853
(1977); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 822 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
961 (1976); United States v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
non? Craft v. United States, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975); United States v. Mallah, 503
F.2d 971, 986 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975); United States v.
American Honda Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 979, 985 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
85. 580 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1978).
86. Id. at 313.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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two separate conspiracies. 8 9 The court agreed that under the
traditional "same evidence" test there were two conspiracies
because the two indictments varied in their facts as to the locations of the activities and the dates on which they occurred.9 o
The court went on to note, however, that the same personnel
were involved in both operations; there were similar methods
of operation; the time frame was approximately the same; there
was "mutual dependence and support" between the two operations constituting the conspiracy; and the Arizona grand jury
had heard testimony concerning events that had taken place
beyond the Arizona location and that had overlapped with the
purportedly separate conspiracy in Minnesota. 91 Thus, while
technically the two indictments covered different specific facts,
the court held that they were so closely related as to indicate
92
one, rather than two, conspiracies.
As the Tercero decision demonstrates, the "totality of the
circumstances" test requires a comprehensive review of the relevant facts. This approach should be recognized as superior to
the traditional tests in determining whether a given course of
conduct constitutes one or several conspiracies. The analysis
required avoids the overly formal and mechanical aspects of
the traditional tests and most importantly, it focuses on the
gravaman of the conspiracy charge: the existence and scope of
the alleged agreement. 93 Analyzed below are the factors that
courts have considered in applying a "totality" analysis. Although all of these factors may not be relevant to a particular
conspiratorial fact pattern, each should be scrutinized to avoid
oversight and to ensure a proper weighing of the factual evidence.

A. OVERLAP IN OVERT ACTs: A THRESHOLD C=rTERION
As noted earlier, most conspiracy indictments allege one or
94
more overt acts that purport to evidence the conspiracy.
When separate conspiracies are alleged, the amount of overlap
in overt acts should be examined because such commonality is
strong evidence that only one conspiracy exists. A single act
can further two conspiracies, 95 but such an occurrence is rare.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 316 & n.15.
Id. at 316.
See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942).
See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Ingman, 541 F.2d 1329, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1976).
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If a defendant can show that one or more significant overt acts
are common to the alleged multiple conspiracies, a presumption should arise that only one conspiracy is involved, rebuttable only by strong evidence tending to prove that the act was in
furtherance of two distinct conspiracies. Similarly, it should be
difficult for a defendant to establish the existence of two separate conspiracies when the defendant's common acts have
aided both operations. Decisive as this factor might be, it is unusual for a significant overlap to occur in double jeopardy cases
because prosecutors are careful to avoid duplicating allegations. 96 More commonly, the government tries to make one
conspiracy appear to be two or more conspiracies by alleging
different overt acts 97-in which case there is no potential overlap for the court to examine.
B.

OVERLAP IN PERSONNEL

Overlap in personnel is the factor most consistently considered by courts, 98 and is probably the most important in determining whether a single or multiple conspiracies exist. If the
same persons are involved in two operations, it is likely that
they are united by one agreement and thus part of one conspiracy. The actual number of overlapping actors is not as important as their role in the operation: an overlap among pivotal
members increases the likelihood that both operations were
part of one conspiracy.9 9 In the due process context, a defendant would likely assert the existence of separate conspiracies
to minimize the connection between the defendant's acts and
the larger conspiracy; overlap in personnel, however, would seriously undermine such an argument. A defendant in the
double jeopardy context would presumably concede involvement in both alleged conspiracies, but such overlap would be
insignificant unless the defendant was the principal organizer
or other conspirators were also common to both operations.
Evidence of communication and other links between members
of a multifaceted operation, without a clear overlap in person96. If the prosecution did duplicate the factual allegations, the "totality of
the circumstances" analysis would be superfluous-the "same evidence" test
alone would be sufficient.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154-55 (5th Cir. 1978).
98. See cases cited in note 79 supra.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 986 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975) ("core member of the large-scale operation participated in both transactions").
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ihel, would still point toward a single conspiracy-albeit not as
persuasively.
C.

TIME SEQUENCE OF OVERT ACTS

Another significant factor is the time sequence of overt
acts. Operations carried on concurrently are perhaps more
likely to be part of the same conspiracy, but a finding of concurrence alone would carry little weight.100 The time sequence is
most important when there is a chronological gap between two
operations. In United States v. Pacelli,'0 for example, a three
month time gap between the overt acts which were alleged to
evidence a single conspiracy was instrumental in the court's
finding of two agreements.102 The longer the interim period between operations, the greater the likelihood that the conspirators made a separate agreement to carry on the second
operation.
D.

METHODS OF OPERATION

The methods of operation factor is perhaps the most difficult to analyze because of the great variety of methods employed in conspiracy cases. Courts typically examine the type
03
of goods involved and the means of transportation employed.1
Although usually considered separately, the locations of meetings and the points of distribution'04 are also elements of the
method of operation. Differences in methods of distribution or
locations of meetings tend to suggest separate operations, but
such differences could also be separate steps or processes
within one conspiracy. Variations in the methods of operation
can be explained in the light of personnel and other factors as
well. In United States v. Tercero, 0 5 for example, marijuana was
allegedly imported into Arizona and then transported to Minnesota. The government argued that these two aspects of the operation evidenced distinct conspiracies, but the court
100. If other factors tend to show two conspiracies, a common time frame is
irrelevant. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 582 F.2d 953, 955 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 821-22 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976).
101. 470 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 983 (1973).
102. Id. at 72.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 315-16 (8th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Moten, 564 F.2d 620, 623-25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959
(1977); United States v. Ingman, 541 F.2d 1329, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 152-54 (2d Cir. 1975).
104. See cases cited in note 82 supra.
105. 580 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1978).
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concluded that this distinction was immaterial since the same
individuals and goods were involved throughout the operation.10 6 Thus, for dissimilarity in methods of operation to be
pertinent, they must reflect fundamentally different objectives,
participants, or time periods.
E.

LOCATION OF OVERT ACTS

Differences in the location of alleged participants or overt
acts may be important, but not where there is evidence of a relationship between the conspirators that transcends the differences in physical location. In United States v. Moten,l0 7 for
example, conspirators were located in New York, Miami, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., but this did not persuade the court
because all had met at one time or another with the principal of
the conspiracy in New York. The court stated:
The point is that Brown [a defendant in the action] was obviously the
kingpin of a single conspiracy regularly dealing with an established
cast. His activity was central to the involvement of all and whether the
drugs ultimately reached the consumer in some other city was not logically pertinent to the operation of the continuing relationship among
108
the parties.

Generally, the locations involved in a course of conduct are not
important standing alone, unless there is an absence of strong
evidence showing an active relationship between alleged conspiracy members.
F.

CONSPIRATORIAL OBJECTIVE

Evidence that members of an alleged conspiracy shared a
common objective may be sufficient to link otherwise diverse
activity into a single conspiracy. For example, in United States
v. American Honda Motor Co.,109 the court found that certain
Honda dealers had participated in a single price-fixing conspiracy, because the dealers shared a common objective to maintain a nationwide pricing policy, "notwithstanding that the
common objective was furthered in diverse ways by different
co-conspirators in separate sections of the nation who may not
have been in actual conspiratorial contact with one another.""0
Since the objective of fixing prices could not be realized by any
one dealer acting alone, only a common goal could explain the
106.
107.

Id. at 316.
564 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977).

108.

Id. at 625.

109.
110.

271 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
Id. at 983-84.
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defendants' actions."'
Thus, similarity in objective can be useful in determining
whether one or several conspiracies exist. Certainly a defendant asserting multiple conspiracies should have some burden of
showing that the conspiracies have distinctly separate goals.
Excessive reliance on this "common objective" factor may beg
the question, however, because a conspiracy is by definition an
agreement to reach a common goal. Admittedly, the exact goal
in most cases cannot be determined without knowing the terms
of the agreement. Consequently, the conspiratorial objective
will usually be no more evident than the agreement itself.
Analyzing the "nature of the enterprise" is often helpful in
determining the existence of a common objective. As noted
earlier, this form of analysis is usually employed in cases involving "chain"-type conspiracies, such as drug distributions, to
create an inference of the requisite knowledge and agreement
among participants in the operation." 2 In effect, the "chain"
structure necessarily implies a common objective. Defendants
in a "chain" conspiracy case who assert the existence of an independent subconspiracy must rebut the presumption that
their actions furthered an agreement to aid the "chain" of distribution." 3 Such defendants might successfully emphasize
other objective factors, such as a gap in time or differing methods of operation. Accordingly, a common objective will not be
the sole determining factor in most cases.
G.

DEGREE OF INTERDEPENDENCE

The degree of interdependence between alleged co-conspirators is a subjective factor similar to the "common objective"
element. Courts rarely reveal what type of evidence they rely
on to determine the degree of interdependencen 4-- conclusions
5
on the matter tend to be stated without explanation." Communication between conspirators and comingling of assets appear to be treated as evidence of interdependence, but it is not
clear how to assess systematically whether one part of a "conspiracy" was actually a separate operation. Perhaps because of
this difficulty, the degree of interdependence is relied upon less
often than other factors in double jeopardy cases.
111. Id. at 984-85.
112. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
114. For example, in the cases cited at note 84 supra, the term is not defined
or analyzed.
115. See cases cited in note 84 supra.
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The degree of interdependence has most frequently been
considered in due process cases in which the defendant has attempted to obtain a severance by arguing the existence of two
conspiracies."16 In such cases, the greater the degree of interdependence, the stronger the argument for considering the
whole operation at one trial. Aside from this type of situation,
the degree of interdependence is helpful only when examination of all other factors is inconclusive. In the American Honda
price-fixing case,1 1 7 for example, the ultimate question was
whether the alleged scheme could best be treated as one large
conspiracy."18 Although other objective factors suggested the
existence of many separate conspiracies, they alone were not
determinative because it was clear from the facts that the success of the operation depended on the cooperation of all defendants. Thus, a correct resolution required the court to focus
on the subjective criteria of interdependence and the commonality of objective. It would seem rare that such a focus would
be required, however, since objective factors such as overlap in
personnel, similarity in methods of operation, and the time sequence of overt acts are easier to evaluate and would probably
be determinative in most cases.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In determining whether a given course of conduct constitutes one or several conspiracies, courts have relied upon a variety of tests. Unfortunately, each test fails, in at least some
factual situations, to address adequately the constitutional
rights of defendants. In the due process context, the "nature of
the enterprise" analysis speaks only to the defendant's knowledge and intent. The analysis is insufficient to determine the
number of conspiracies involved, which is the crucial finding
underlying severance rights and the avoidance of verdicts
based on "guilt by association." In the double jeopardy context, the "same evidence" and "same transaction" tests, the
traditional methods of analyzing the "single versus multiple
conspiracy" question, are both inadequate. These tests are vul116. See, e.g., United States v. Moten, 564 F.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 959 (1977); United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 853 (1977); United States v. Leong, 536 F.2d 993, 995 (2d Cir.
1976).
117. United States v. American Honda Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Cal.
1967).
118. Id. at 983-84.
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nerable to manipulation by prosecutors, and simply fail to address fact issues that are highly relevant in conspiracy cases.
If the terms of a conspiracy agreement are known, the
Braverman rule controls-the number of agreements determines the number of conspiracies. The scope of an agreement
is rarely so easy to determine, however. Most often the objectives underlying each defendant's conduct must be examined
to ascertain the scope and number of agreements and, hence,
the number of conspiracies. This factual inquiry is best conducted through the "totality of the circumstances" analysis
now employed by some courts. In both the due process and
double jeopardy contexts, courts should methodologically evaluate the seven criteria of the "totality" approach to establish a
sufficient factual basis to ensure a comprehensive, carefully
reasoned decision. Only such an approach will give defendants
a reasonable opportunity to assert their due process or double
jeopardy rights.

